From Emerson to Trump: Capitalism, Meritocracy and the Virtue of Money

The political triumph of Donald Trump has taken many by surprise on both sides of the Atlantic. But as the world is trying to find explanations for his mass endorsement by U.S. voters, one aspect has received little attention so far: namely the culturally ingrained American assumption that free markets are ruled by a metaphysical mechanism that rewards moral behavior. More than merely venues for economic competition and exchange, they tend to be perceived as a societal filter that helps single out the most talented and worthy individuals. This tenet has entered America’s collective bloodstream as a part of the individualist intellectual tradition, of which Ralph Waldo Emerson is the main architect. Against this background, Trump’s public appeal can be interpreted not as an epidemic lapse in political judgement or a sudden outburst of blatant racism, but rather as a logical consequence of a firmly established cultural code.

The ideological rift that has opened up in the beginning of the twenty-first century between the USA and notably also its Western allies has given rise to feelings of perplexity and discontent on both sides. While American society has been grappling with an ongoing national identity crisis and struggling to find explanations for the country’s international image loss, a broad anti-Americanism has held sway in Europe, more often than not taking a stance of incomprehension and disapproval towards U.S. policies. With Donald Trump’s election as U.S. president, this estrangement has reached a new climax. To most Europeans it is simply unfathomable why millions of Americans are willing to lay their political future into the hands of a man who has long been known for his volatile and fickle personality, and who offers a giant wall as the answer to modern problems of migration, wishes to see Muslims banned from visiting the United States, thinks of Belgium as a “nice city”, and  has no qualms tweeting Mussolini quotes.[1] But also to many observers within the U.S., Trump’s success is “the greatest American mystery at the moment”[2].

The Western European public has been observing Trump’s political trajectory with the same sentiment that accompanies watching the proverbial train wreck; while one part of you desperately wants to avoid it, the other is not sure if what you’re witnessing is actually real–and is curious to see what happens next. And so the prevalent mode of covering Trump’s ventures has been to exploit their entertainment value as we once again shook our heads at the “crazy Americans”. Indeed, on this side of the Atlantic the mass endorsement of Trump is mostly perceived as just the latest in a string of fiercely irrational political behaviors, ranging from the fear of general health care to the aversion against tightening gun laws, or the inability to let go of the ideal of deregulated markets even in the wake of two devastating financial crises brought on by not too much, but too little government intervention. This time we were watching in disbelief as a presidential candidate announced that he is “smart” to not pay any federal income tax and made the size of his genitals the topic of political debate. And while many commentators were refusing to take the “insult clown” seriously, Donald Trump cleared hurdle after hurdle to become the most powerful person in the world.

Even as some of Trump’s pre-election statements – from the “Babygate” incident to his verbal attack on the parents of a fallen Muslim U.S. army captain, or his insinuation that shooting Hillary Clinton may be a viable political strategy – were so obviously damaging that they gave reason to suspect that the billionaire himself was trying to back out of a publicity stunt gone too far, his blunders were obviously not enough to discourage a large mass of U.S. citizens from casting their vote for him. Already following his nomination as Republican candidate, Huffington Post offered the diagnosis that “Trump Won Super Tuesday Because America is Racist”[3]. But even though racial tensions are far from being resolved in U.S. society, it seems rather harsh to flat out dismiss a whole country as a nation of bigots.

Like most political phenomena, Donald Trump’s mass appeal is a product of a combination of factors, some ideological and some pragmatic in nature. They include the fear of terrorism, the nostalgic longing for a simpler time with simpler answers, and not least the plain fact that Trump has the financial resources to fund his own presidential campaign. Another common explanation for Trump’s success is his status as an American icon and stock figure of the global pop culture. Indeed one could argue that entertainment and politics have become so utterly intertwined in U.S. society as to become almost indistinguishable, and that, as a matter of course, being able to draw attention is equated to having something to say. Have Americans become so mesmerized by a cultural mainstream geared towards amusement and recognition value that they have lost all sense for the seriousness of political reality? Or is it to the contrary that Americans have grown tired of abstract ideological debate and are driven by a collective longing for a straight-forward, hands-on political style? After all, what makes Trump a viable political leader in the eyes of many Americans is precisely the fact that he has proven himself “in the real word” by holding his ground in the unforgiving realm of business.

Albeit, a closer look at the billionaire’s background reveals that he is neither the self-made man nor the competent businessman he is often perceived to be; not only has his enormous starting capital been accumulated by his father, but according to some assessments he would have been wealthier today had he not engaged in any business activities at all. However, what is most interesting in this context is not whether or not Trump actually lives up to his image, but that to Americans it is somehow self-evident that financial success qualifies a person as their head of state.

As Europe woke up to the result of the U.S. presidential election, what had been the elephant in the global room became a subject of open discussion: Has America become politically insane? As crude as this may sound, variants of this question have been asked for some time now in the public as well as academic discourse. Already in August of this year, German Vice Chancellor Minister Sigmar Gabriel warned of an “irrational America” with a view to Trump’s possible election as U.S. president.[4] But even well before the New York tycoon had entered the race for the White House, the common political vocabulary of Europe and the United States had been shrinking dramatically. Was ist nur mit den Amis los? (“What’s going on with the Americans?”) is a recently published book that describes the intercultural communication problem from the German perspective. By the same token, studies with telling titles such as America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked probe the causes for the increasing ideological alienation between the United States and other Western nations from the American point of view.[5] Not surprisingly, the authors of this research come to the conclusion that a major source of the differences between U.S. citizens and members of other societies can be found in America’s individualistic tradition, which in many ways seems to be “a fundamental aberration from the historically typical norm”[6]. Indeed, the strong collective emphasis on self-reliance and the resulting hostility towards state influence is directly linked to political issues such as the notorious patchiness of the U.S. pension, health and welfare systems, the lack of universal educational standards, or the privatization of key institutions ranging from prisons to the Federal Reserve System.

While in the eyes of many Europeans the expulsion of state authority from such crucial public sectors makes for a rather precarious sociopolitical landscape, U.S. citizens welcome this practice as the ultimate instrument of democracy. For, in the American mind the regulatory vacuum created by the exiled state power is filled by the classic capitalist ideal of free markets. Even in a world dominated by the unpredictable ripples and earthquakes of a global economy, many Americans conceptualize a free marketplace in the most basic manner, namely as a commercial and financial environment free of any state interference and ruled exclusively by the supposedly incorruptible mechanism of supply and demand. Unlike in Europe, where the word “capitalism” carried a distinctly negative connotation well into the 1980s and was mainly used by its opponents to criticize bourgeois, exploitative economic conditions, the broad American public has always upheld the capitalist economic order almost unreservedly as a guarantor of personal freedom, prosperity and equality of opportunity. In keeping with this mindset, the economic system regularly makes the top of the list when Americans are asked about the sources of their patriotism. For unlike the state, which by definition is based on a degree of centralistic organization, the principle of free markets seems to be perfectly congruent with the individualist moral catalogue in that – so goes the theory – different personal talents and potentials can share and shape the marketplace on equal terms. In other words, free markets are understood to be the economic manifestation of individualist values.

Against this background, the mass endorsement of Trump can be interpreted not so much as an epidemic lapse in political judgement or a sudden outburst of blatant racism, but rather as a logical consequence of a firmly established cultural code. It is a based on a deeply ingrained collective assumption that free markets are ruled by a metaphysical mechanism which rewards moral behavior. More than merely venues for economic competition and exchange, they are perceived as a societal filter that helps single out the most talented and worthy individuals.

To trace the underlying logic of this paradigm, it is useful to turn to the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) as a key figure in U.S. cultural history. Even as he is certainly not the only source of individualist ideas in the United States, he remains the figurehead of this most American of intellectual currents and “the single best place to see how the self-rule of classical Stoicism, the Bildung of Goethe, the subjective theology of Schleiermacher, and the revolution of Kant and his successors come to be translated into accessible language […] and–what is much more important–shown to have a constant bearing on everyday life”[7]. His eclectic philosophy still stands as an expression of a typically American sensibility, combining national confidence, optimism, religious fervor and readiness for iconoclastic experimentation. As David Marr has pointed out, “Emerson’s ideas themselves have been so influential in American life and thought, that the Emersonian tradition serves as a powerful means of mapping the leading discursive formations of the last 150 years in the United States”[8]. And although it would certainly be inappropriate to plot too straight a line between the Bard of Concord and current political developments, he undoubtedly remains one of the main architects of a sensibility that still manifests in the way Americans think about politics. Emerson’s individualistic tenets have long entered America’s collective bloodstream, have become common cultural property, also impacting the lives of those who have never read him or even heard of him. And so the Emersonian brand of individualism may hold at least part of the answer to the question that is currently puzzling the world public: How is it that Donald Trump has emerged as the 45th American president?

At first glance, it may seem rather far-fetched to draw ideological links between a nineteenth century thinker whose idealistic philosophy is aimed at life-long mental and spiritual self-cultivation and an uncouth and intellectually unsophisticated tycoon who has become the epitome of dull money worship. But as radically different as these two protagonists may be, their ideological positions cannot be conveniently reduced to the opposition of idealism versus materialism. For the fact that Emerson was a dyed-in-the-wool idealist makes it all too easy to overlook that even in its most esoteric moments his philosophy holds important implications for the material sphere. Emerson explicitly included the economic dimension in his reflections, and although his individual is clearly motivated by the ideational goals of emotional and intellectual self-advancement, it is far from being an ascetic. Rather, Emerson declares material prosperity to be an integral part of the project of self-realization. “Man was born to be rich”, is his optimistic message (CW 4:53). For him, there is no fundamental rivalry between mind and matter, mundanity and spirituality. Instead he assumes that inner and outer development go hand in hand. Believing these realms to be subject to the same principles, he supposes that, at least in the long run, the material balance reflects the degree of a person’s spiritual development:

Money, which represents the prose of life, and which is hardly spoken of in parlors without apology, is, in its effects and laws, as beautiful as roses. Property keeps the accounts of the world, and is always moral. The property will be found where the labor, the wisdom, and the virtue has been in nations, in classes, and (the whole life-time considered, with the compensations) in the individual also. (CW 3:136)

With this assumption Emerson stands in a long Protestant tradition. As Max Weber famously argued in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, interpreting prosperity as a visible manifestation of a godly way of life is a typically Protestant trait. Instead of separating “lower” worldly matters from the “higher” sphere of religion, these areas of life are amalgamated through an “acceptance of his life in the world as a task”[9]. The concept of vocation as calling, which can already be encountered in Martin Luther’s writings, is also taken up by Emerson. But he goes even further in establishing a causal connection between internal and external commodities. For even as Protestantism postulates that virtues such as diligence, discipline, honesty and a restrained appetite for worldly pleasures tend to support the accumulation of wealth, some friction losses are anticipated in this virtue-to-money production mechanism. In other words, there is no guarantee that good deeds will invariably yield positive material results, since the full reward for a moral lifestyle is still deferred to the afterlife. Consequently, wealth may merely serve as a possible indicator, not as conclusive prove of virtue. By contrast, Emerson radically shifts the venue of divine justice into the here and now. “Justice is not postponed”, he assures his readers. “A perfect equity adjusts its balance in all parts of life. […] Every secret is told, every crime is punished, every virtue rewarded, every wrong redressed, in silence and certainty.” (CW 2:60) He is confident that the world is ruled by an infallible universal mechanism of justice, which he calls “compensation”. This principle also extends to the commercial marketplace, where it takes on the form a purifying power that ensures social mobility and vitality:

We complain of [trade’s] oppression of the poor, and of its building up a new aristocracy on the ruins of the aristocracy it destroyed. But the aristocracy of trade has no permanence, is not entailed, was the result of toil and talent, the result of merit of some kind, and is continually falling, like the waves of the sea, before new claims of the same sort. Trade is an instrument in the hands of that friendly Power which works for us in our own despite. (JMN 9:61–62)

What is important here is that the marketplace is not only cast as a kind of social immune system, but is even attributed a magical quality. It is described as being subject to causal forces that are beyond the reach of human understanding and control, so that any attempt to deliberately manipulate its natural dynamics must ultimately lead to the corruption of its positive effects. Only if not interfered with can this benevolent divine force unfold its supernatural qualities to the benefit of all, so that even as we “aim at a petty end quite aside from the public good, […] our act arranges itself by irresistible magnetism in a line with the poles of the world” (CW 2:64).

This unshakeable confidence in the inherent wisdom and fairness of deregulated markets has always dominated the American understanding of economy. It has taken deep root in the American psyche as the economic dimension of individualism. So it is hardly a coincidence that it was Emerson’s declared admirer Ronald Reagan – seen by some as “our most Emersonian president”[10] – who more than any other U.S. head of state personified American capitalism and the principle of laisser-faire. But if the motto “Greed is good” has resonated so strongly in U.S. culture, it is important to appreciate that in the American mindscape the pursuit of material possessions is not automatically equated to sheer materialism, and indeed pecuniary aspects are of subordinate importance here. Rather, the capitalist market has a deeper meaning in American culture as a “a very intellectual force” (CW 1:233) It is seen as “the principle of Liberty; that […] planted America and destroyed Feudalism; that […] makes peace and keeps peace” (CW 1:234). With such theurgic qualities, the market becomes a resonance body that responds favorably to the right moral attitudes and actions. It takes on the role of an incorruptible judge who makes sure that material goods will eventually be distributed exactly according to personal merit. “Let them compete”, as Emerson proclaimed, “and success to the strongest, who are always, at last, the wisest and best.” (UL: 6).

Steeped as their culture is in this Emersonian blend of individualism and capitalist optimism, Americans are conditioned to implicitly interpret business success as a kind of character quality certification. In the ideological climate of mainstream America, Trump’s alleged success as an entrepreneur does not only distinguish him in the purely economic sense, but indirectly also endows him with the nimbus of a moral hero who has emerged victorious from a character trial in a competition governed by moral principles. In this spirit, many Americans would probably still agree with Emerson that the “powers that make the capitalist are metaphysical” (LL 1:141).

Trump has been capitalizing on this collective reflex by repeatedly redirecting political debates to the economic terrain. As Thomas Frank of The Guardian observed: “In fact, to judge by how much time he spent talking about it, trade may be his single biggest concern–not white supremacy. Asked about his political excommunication by Mitt Romney, he chose to pivot and talk about … trade.” Of course, given Trump’s capricious personality it is hard to know whether he does it based on political calculus, by cultural instinct, or simply out of personal habit. But the strategy works. And it works because it taps into America’s century-old desire to replace government with the market. Emerson, the “American Confucius”[11], once predicted that “[t]rade goes to make the governments insignificant” (CW 1:233). But if the markets are the better government, the successful businessman may well be the better politician. In a country so strongly committed to meritocratic notions, a business mogul of Trump’s caliber is almost by default associated with a cultural elite that is considered to be much more than just a bunch of rich people, namely the driving force and energetic center at the heart of democratic society.

Fittingly, as in the first presidential debate on September 26, 2016 Hilary Clinton drew attention to the fact that Trump has failed to release his tax returns, the first thing she chose to bring into play as a possible reason was “that maybe he’s not as rich as he says he is”. This one sentence reveals the whole depth of the divide separating U.S. and European political sensibilities: In Europe, politicians usually try to appear less wealthy than they actually are because they want people to still be able to identify with them. Being too rich tends to create suspicion. Quite to the contrary in the United States, where the public is prone to identify affluence with choosing the right and righteous path in life. Here, apparently being not rich enough is what makes you morally suspect.

Of course this fixation on material success, though encouraged by the distorted echoes of Emerson’s individualistic message, is in itself not Emersonian individualism. The truncated and vulgarized versions of Emerson’s philosophy that have been adopted into the cultural mainstream are as far from the rich and complex fabric of his ideas as Trump is from being the ideal independent personality that the Bard of Concord once envisioned. But it is easy to see how quickly the call for personal independence can be reduced to financial aspects, so that a magnate like Donald Trump suddenly seems to fit perfectly into the slot of cultural hero. And even as there are various reasons why he strikes a chord with the American public, the momentum of a national subconscious permeated by the precepts of individualist ideology should not be underestimated among these factors. Although individualism has undeniably been a potent positive force in American history, it has come with ideological stowaways. Among them is the collective tendency to uncritically presuppose a metaphysical relationship between financial success and morality. The fact that this attribution process is seldom a product of conscious reflection but rather a culturally imprinted mental kneejerk reaction makes it even more powerful. After all, nothing has a stronger grip on us than the taken-for-granted, and therefore unchallenged and unrestrained, aspects of our culture.

 

Abbreviations

CW    Emerson, Ralph Waldo, The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Ed. Robert E. Spiller and Alfred R. Ferguson, 7 volumes. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971–2013.

JMN   Emerson, Ralph Waldo, The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Ed. William H. Gilman et al., 16 volumes. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960–1982.

LL      Emerson, Ralph Waldo, The Later Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1843–1871. Ed. Ronald A. Bosco and Joel Myerson, 2 volumes. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001.

UL      Emerson, Ralph Waldo, Uncollected Lectures: Reports of Lectures on American Life and Natural Religion. Ed. Clarence Gohdes. New York: Rudge, 1932.

References

[1] On 28 February 2016, Trump tweeted “It is better to live one day as a lion than 100 years as a sheep.”

[2] Frank, Thomas. “Millions of ordinary Americans support Donald Trump. Here’s why”, The Guardian, 8 March 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/07/donald-trump-why-americans-support&gt;.

[3] King, Brittany. “Trump Won Super Tuesday Because America is Racist”, Huffington Post, 2 March 2016. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brittany-king-/trump-won-super-tuesday-because-america-is-racist_b_9367650.html&gt;.

[4] Gabriel, Sigmar. “Brauchen mehr, nicht weniger Integration – Interview mit der Funke Gruppe”.

[5] Kohut, Andrew, and Bruce Stokes, America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked. New York: Times Books, 2006.

[6] Marschall, Christoph von, Was ist nur mit den Amis los?: Warum sie an Barack Obama hassen, was wir lieben. Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder GmbH, 2012, 43.

[7] Richardson, Robert D., Emerson: The Mind on Fire. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, 322.

[8] Marr, David, American Worlds Since Emerson. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988, 10.

[9] Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2003, 88.

[10] Diggins, John Patrick, Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom and the Making of History. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007, 37.

[11] Warren, Joyce W., The American Narcissus: Individualism and Women in Nineteenth-Century American Fiction. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1984, 24.

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